Simulations are used to analyze welfare and market-and farm-level effects of making futures available to producers of a storable commodity. Key features of the model are the explicit consideration of dynamic impacts due to inventories, and of aggregate market effects associated with futures adoption by some producers. Application to the natural rubber market shows that futures availability can lead to sizeable market-and farm-level effects. Futures availability enhances consumer welfare, reduces non-adopter welfare, and yields important welfare gains for adopters when their market share is small and welfare losses when they account for a sufficiently large market share.
DO FUTURES BENEFIT FARMERS?
Vulnerability to risks is among the most important problems faced by commodity producers in developing economies (see Roumasset, Boussard, and Singh 1979) and developed economies (see Just and Pope 2001) alike. Concerns with price risk have led countries to adopt schemes intended to stabilize prices (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981) . Similarly, governments have often underwritten crop insurance policies to curb producers' yield risks (Hazell, Pomareda, and Valdez 1986, Coble and Knight 2001) .
Large-scale government-led price stabilization schemes have proven to be unsustainable (Gardner 1988, p. 303) . For the specific case of the natural rubber market discussed later in the present article, Burger and Smit (2001) provide an account of the demise of the price support These facts may explain the recent interest in promoting the use of institutional markets, such as futures markets, to manage the price risks affecting commodity producers (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1994 and 1998 ). An example of such interest is the International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management in Developing Countries (ITF) convened by the World Bank. The ITF includes international institutions, producer and consumer organizations, major commodity exchanges, and commodity trading firms (ITF 1999, Annex 5) . Succinctly, the ITF has recommended facilitating the use of market-based riskmanagement instruments by developing country commodity producers (ITF 1999, Preface) .
The promotion of futures and other similar tools to manage commodity producers' price risks is based on the assumption that they increase the well-being of their adopters. This assumption is valid from the standpoint of a single producer who adopts such tools, as he would not use them if they made him worse off. However, the assumption need not hold when many producers adopt risk-management tools simultaneously. This is true because the aggregation of individual responses may adversely affect the commodity market as a whole (e.g., spot prices may fall if hedging induces an increase in adopter output). The first theoretical studies to specifically address this issue in the context of forward (as opposed to futures) markets for storable commodities were Kawai (1983) and Britto (1984) for storable commodities, and Turnovsky (1983) for nonstorable commodities.
Conceptually, two approaches may be used to quantify the impact of futures on producer welfare, taking into account the aggregate effect of adopters' decisions on the market. The first approach is to perform econometric estimation with historical data. Unfortunately, this method is unlikely to have much power due to the high volatility of many of the series involved (e.g., price and output) and the likely existence of structural changes (e.g., changes in production technology) in the past. Further, it requires data that usually are not available (e.g., long time series on individual producers' behavior before and after adoption). Not surprisingly, there are no studies pursuing this line of research.
The second approach consists of building economic models of the market(s) under analysis in terms of "deep parameters," and simulating their behavior with and without futures markets. Otherwise, if some of the model's parameters depended on the policy regimes under consideration, the analysis would be subject to the famous "Lucas' critique" (Lucas 1976 ). Deep parameters are those unaffected by the policy intervention being studied. For example, weather variability is a deep parameter in the case of agricultural futures. In contrast, the variance of spot prices is not a deep parameter because it is endogenous, as it is affected by producers' optimal production responses to the availability of futures. Disadvantages of the simulation approach are that its results are model-specific, and that they apply to real-world problems only insofar as the latter are realistically represented by the underlying economic model. To the best of our knowledge, Turnovsky and Campbell (1985) is the only previous attempt to use the simulation approach to analyze the welfare effects of introducing a forward market for a storable commodity. Lence and Hayes (2002) resorted to the simulation approach to analyze U.S. farm programs, but they did not allow for futures trading.
The main contributions of the present article are the incorporation of dynamics due to inventory effects and the consideration of the aggregate effects of futures adopters. The model is based on the rational storage paradigm (Williams and Wright 1991; Deaton and Laroque 1992, 1996; Chambers and Bailey 1996) , and incorporates realistic features not considered in the two studies most closely related to the present one, namely, Turnovsky (1983) and Turnovsky and Campbell (1985) . In particular, the proposed model involves futures rather than forward markets, allows for stockouts, does not rely on a mean-variance framework, and accounts for the fact that futures need not be made available to (or be adopted by) all producers. By allowing for nonadopters, we can quantify the changes in their optimal behavior and welfare induced by the other producers' adoption of futures.
In addition, we show how to apply the model for policy analysis purposes, by parameterizing it so as to represent the natural rubber market. Natural rubber is of practical interest because its price is volatile (ITF 2001) , and the potential adoption of futures by natural rubber producers has attracted attention from academia (Zant 2001) , as well as from the ITF (ITF 2001). Zant (2001) analyzed the impact of making hedging tools available in India. He showed that the welfare of India's natural rubber producers would increase substantially if hedging mechanisms were available. However, in calculating welfare effects, he took into account neither the market impact of the changes in farmers' output decisions induced by the hedging scheme, nor the dynamic effects that are central to the present study. The ITF (2001) analyzed the feasibility of offering price insurance tools to natural rubber growers in Thailand. The ITF study assumed that many of Thailand's natural rubber producers would greatly benefit from being able to reduce their price risks, but it did not attempt to quantify such welfare gains.
A Theoretical Model for the Spot Market of a Storable Crop
The present study focuses on the impact of making futures contracts available to some of the farmers who produce a storable crop. Such producers are labeled "adopters," and the rest of the farmers are referred to as "non-adopters." The total crop supply at date t is given by total output plus carry-in storage (I t ):
(1)
Total Crop Supply at Time t = n A q A,t + n N q N,t + I t , where n A (n N ) is the number of adopters (non-adopters), and q A,t (q N,t ) is the average output per adopting (non-adopting) farmer. The crop can be used to satisfy demand for current consumption (C t ), or it can be purchased by speculators to store and resell in the future (I t+1 ). Market equilibrium at time t requires that total supply be equal to total demand. That is,
where the inequality in (2) follows from the fact that storage cannot be negative.
Solving for market equilibrium (2) requires specifying functional forms for the different components of market demand and supply. Such components are described next.
Demand for Current Consumption
Aggregate demand for current consumption (C t ) is postulated to be of a standard isoelastic form:
(3)
where P t denotes the crop's world price at time t, δ 0 > 0 is a scaling parameter, δ 1 > 0 is the elasticity of demand for current consumption, and ε C,t > 0 is a random demand shock (e.g., a disturbance to income). Without loss of generality, the mean of the random shock is set equal to one (Mean(ε C,t ) = 1).
1
Demand for Speculative Stocks
Demand for speculative purposes is driven by the expectation of making profits from storage.
Under perfect competition, speculators' (discounted) expected profits from buying one unit of the crop at time t, storing it, and selling it at t + 1 must satisfy condition (4) in equilibrium:
where E t (⋅) is the expectation operator conditional on information available at time t, r denotes the interest rate, and φ represents the cost of storing one unit of the crop for one period. If (4) does not hold, speculators will buy more units of the crop at time t with the purpose of selling them at time t + 1, which is inconsistent with equilibrium.
When storage is expected to be unprofitable (i.e., [E t (P t+1 )/(1 + r) − P t − φ] < 0), speculators will reduce their commodity holdings, thereby exerting downward pressure on current prices P t and causing an upward revision in the next-period's price expectations E t (P t+1 ).
However, such a process need not drive the left-hand side of (4) to zero because storage cannot be reduced below zero. It follows that equilibrium also implies that condition (5) must hold for speculative storage demand:
Together, (4) and (5) define the demand for speculative storage (Deaton and Laroque 1992) .
Farmers' Supply in the Absence of Futures Markets
Crop output is assumed to be the result of farmers' optimal decisions based on their underlying preferences and production technologies. Unfortunately, modeling heterogeneous populations of adopting and non-adopting farmers is intractable from a computational standpoint. Hence, the analysis relies upon the characterization of a representative adopter and a representative nonadopter.
For both adopters and non-adopters, the amount of crop produced by farmers of type j at time t (q j,t ) is equal to the product of farmers' planned output as of time t -1 (x j,t−1 ≡ E t−1 (q j,t )) and a time-t output shock ε qj,t > 0:
for j = A and N. By construction, the random output shock must have a mean equal to one (Mean(ε qj,t ) = E t−1 (ε qj,t ) = 1).
2 At time t -1, type-j farmers choose the level of planned output x j,t−1 that maximizes the expected utility of their time-t profits π j,t = p j,t x ε qj,t -v j (x):
In (7), U j (·), v j (·) denote, respectively, the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and the variable cost function of type-j farmers, and p j,t represents the local price received by producers of type j.
For numerical simulation purposes, the utility function is specialized to the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) form U j (π) = − exp(− λ j π), where λ j is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion corresponding to type-j farmers. 3 Similarly, the variable cost function is specialized to the power form v j (x) = θ j,0 1 , j x θ , where θ j,0 > 0 is a scaling parameter, and θ j,1 is the elasticity of cost with respect to planned output. 4 Increasing marginal costs require θ j,1 > 1; further, θ j,1 ≥ 2 is necessary for marginal costs to rise at an increasing rate. Finally, the local price received by type-j farmers is assumed to be stochastically linked to the world price with p j,t = P t ε pj,t , where ε pj,t > 0 is a random shock. Shock ε pj,t represents the imperfections in the transmission of world prices to the local market of type-j farmers.
Supply by Adopting Farmers when Futures Markets Are Available
Optimization problem (7) 
Note that actual production is uncertain at the time of hedging it, and that the relevant price in the futures market is the world crop price P t , as opposed to the local price p A,t . The lesser the adopters' uncertainty about production and price-transmission shocks (ε qA,t and ε pA,t , respectively), the greater the potential is to reduce their risks by hedging.
When crop futures are available to adopters, solving the model requires specifying the mechanism by which futures prices are formed. For this purpose, futures prices are assumed to be equal to the conditional expectation of the next period's world prices:
Condition (9) rules out the possibility of adopting farmers trading futures for speculative purposes. That is, (9) implies that the only incentive for adopters to trade futures contracts is to hedge their exposure to price risk. This is a desirable restriction, given the present study's aim of analyzing the effect of futures availability associated with their usage as risk management tools, as opposed to their utilization as instruments for speculation. Otherwise, adopting farmers could be made arbitrarily better off if allowed to trade in futures to exploit (expected) speculative profitable opportunities.
Expectations and Crop Market Equilibrium
As pointed out earlier, market equilibrium at time t requires (2) to hold. Given the planned output decisions made by farmers at t -1 (x A,t−1 and x N,t−1 ) and the actual output shocks at t (ε qA,t and ε qN,t ), time-t actual production is obtained from (6). Actual output plus the storage decision made by speculators at t -1 (I t ) determine total supply at t, as shown in (1). That is, total supply at t is determined by agents' decisions made at t -1 and by date-t output shocks. Given the date-t current consumption shock ε C,t and expectations about the next-period's price E t (P t+1 ), the current price P t must adjust so that demand for current consumption and speculative storage satisfy equilibrium condition (2).
Clearly, the equilibrium values of current consumption, world prices, and ending stocks ( eq t C , eq t P , and eq t I 1 + , respectively) are affected by the current expectations about next-period's world price E t (P t+1 ), because speculative storage demand (i.e., (4) and (5)) is a function of functions of the entire probability distribution of the next-period's world price and the output and price-transmission shocks, conditional on the current information. This is true because the next-period's actual output (q j,t+1 ) depends on the planned output level chosen in the current period (x j,t ) so as to maximize expected utility (7). Hence, the market equilibrium cannot be solved for unless one specifies how farmers and speculative storers form their expectations.
Here, decision makers are assumed to be rational, in the sense that their subjective expectations of the random variables are equal to the objective expectations of such variables implied by the model. As in Newbery and Stiglitz (1981, ch. 10) , the reasons for postulating rational expectations are threefold. First, from a practical standpoint, hypothesizing non-rational expectations poses a significant challenge. This is true because there is an infinite number of ways in which expectations can be rendered non-rational, and one would be forced to arbitrarily choose one from among them. Second, from an analytical perspective, assuming rational expectations allows one to focus on the benefits of futures for adopters, arising from their usage as a risk-management tool, rather than from their potential to yield informational gains. For example, if storers did not have rational price expectations, they could obtain informational gains without having to trade futures contracts, by choosing optimal storage levels based on futures prices instead of their own (irrational) price expectations. Finally, rational expectations, together with (9), eliminate the possibility of obtaining arbitrarily large (expected) speculative gains by exploiting informational inefficiencies in the futures market.
Welfare Analysis
Welfare analysis requires the explicit consideration of agents' utilities with and without futures, and of the corresponding changes in the equilibrium probability density functions (pdfs) of the endogenous variables. Here, the welfare effects caused by the availability of futures are measured by means of compensating incomes.
To see how the compensating income of adopting farmers ( A Y ) is calculated, consider two thought experiments. In experiment 1, futures are not available before random time t, but starting at that time they are made available to adopters forever. In experiment 2, the scenario is similar to that of experiment 1, with the difference that starting at time t adopters are given a certain amount of income Y A in each period, forever, instead of allowing them to trade in futures. To measure consumer compensating income ( C Y ), note that demand schedule (3) can be derived by assuming a representative consumer characterized by the quasilinear utility function
where Z t denotes a composite good, P Z,t is its price, and W t is the consumer's wealth. Using the budget constraint to obtain Z t = W t /P Z,t -P t /P Z,t C t , and plugging the resulting expression into the
the first-order necessary condition (FOC) corresponding to optimal commodity consumption is 
Numerical Methods
To analyze the behavior of equilibrium endogenous variables (e.g., prices) in the model introduced in the preceding section, one must first solve for the market equilibrium conditions under each possible state of the world. This is not a trivial task, because the model has no closedform solution and is highly nonlinear. Here, the model is solved using the method developed by
Williams and Wright (Judd 1998, ch. 12 and 17) . The essence of this method consists of estimating the function ) ( ⋅ Ψ that approximates the price expectation conditional on information at time t as a function of time-t carry-over storage, i.e., E t (P t+1 ) = Ψ(I t+1 ). The rationale for the latter equality is that E t (P t+1 ) can only depend on information available at time t, and current optimal storage I t+1 must incorporate all such information.
The computer algorithm is sketched in Williams and Wright (1991, ch. 3) . Cubic splines are used for the function approximant ) ( ⋅ Ψ , and the pdfs of the exogenous random shocks are approximated by Gaussian quadrature (Judd 1998) . The cubic spline interpolation used is based on 63 nodes, which are more densily distributed over the range where ) ( ⋅ Ψ exhibits the greatest nonlinearities in order to achieve greater accuracy. The Gaussian quadrature scheme relies on three nodes for each exogenous random variable. The number of nodes is chosen to obtain an acceptable level of accuracy, while maintaining computational feasibility. The cubic spline interpolation and Gaussian quadrature schemes are calculated by means of the programming language MATLAB version 7.0, using the computer routines developed by Miranda and Fackler.
Model Parameterization
The postulated model is highly stylized, as it is intended to capture key features common to agricultural commodity markets in general. For policy analysis, however, the model is most useful when parameterized to represent specific market scenarios. To demonstrate how it can be used to draw inferences about the effects of adopting futures, we have set its parameter values so as to simulate the natural rubber market. Parameter values corresponding to the natural rubber market can be obtained from previous studies or calibrated to match key measures reported in the literature.
The parameterization used to represent the natural rubber market, as well as the sources it is based on, are reported in table 1. The values for the scaling parameters (n A , n N , δ 0 , θ A,0 , and θ N,0 ) and the means of the exogenous price-transmission shocks (Mean(ε pA,t ) and Mean(ε pN,t )) are assigned so as to scale the units of measurement of the present system of equations around the unit value. This is achieved by setting δ 0 = Mean(ε pA,t ) = Mean(ε pN,t ) = 1, θ A,0 = 1/θ A,1 , and θ N,0 = 1/θ N,1 , and by scaling the numbers of adopting and non-adopting farmers so that n A + n N = 1.
Scaling enhances the accuracy of the numerical solutions by avoiding the computation of variables whose orders of magnitude are substantially different (Judd 1998, ch. 2) . The advocated scaling implies that the equilibrium values of adopter output, non-adopter output, current consumption, and prices all equal one when all exogenous random variables are fixed at their mean values for all dates t. That is, if all exogenous random variables were fixed at their mean values at all times, equilibrium in the scaled model would be characterized by q A,t = q N,t = C t = P t = p A,t = p N,t = 1 for all t. In such non-stochastic equilibrium, total output would also equal one (n A q A,t + n N q N,t = 1 for all t), and storage would be zero (i.e., I t+1 = 0 for all t). Besides being important for improving numerical accuracy, scaling has the advantage of facilitating the interpretation of results. For example, the results in tables 2 through 4 correspond to stochastic scenarios. Hence, comparing them with the non-stochastic benchmark allows one to easily infer the impact of introducing randomness into the system. Following Zant (2001) , the observation period (i.e., the time elapsed between t and t + 1) for the simulations is set equal to three months. The values used for the elasticity of demand (δ 1 = 0.25), the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (λ j = 4.7), the elasticity of production costs (θ j,1 = 2), the quarterly variable storage costs (φ = 0.009), and the quarterly interest rate (r = 0.015) are consistent not only with the natural rubber market, but also with the values used in studies of other agricultural commodities. For example, Newbery and Stiglitz (1981, p. 295 ) and Williams and Wright (1991, p. 38) use annual storage costs of φ = 0.02, and the coefficient of relative risk aversion of 3.1 implied by λ j = 4.7 is well within the range considered typical by Gollier (2001, pp. 31 and 289) and Kocherlakota (1996) .
The exogenous random shocks (ε C,t , ε qj,t , and ε pj,t ) are assumed to be independently and identically log-normally distributed because they must be positive. The standard deviations (StDs) of the exogenous random shocks represent the respective coefficients of variation (CVs), as well, because their means equal one. StD(ε C,t ) = CV(ε C,t ) = 0.158 is the only figure not taken from previous studies, but is the value required for the simulations to yield CV(P t ) = 23%, which is the CV of the world price of natural rubber implied by the data in Zant (2001, p. 709) . CV(P t ) = 23% is consistent historical values for agricultural commodities in general (see Newbery and Stiglitz 1981, p. 291) .
For the simulations representing the case of futures being adopted by relatively few farmers, the numbers of adopters and non-adopters are set at n A = 0.1 and n N = 0.9, respectively.
In other words, such simulations assume that adopters account for 10% of world output. In the case of natural rubber, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and India are the top four producing countries and account for approximately 33%, 24%, 13%, and 8%, respectively, of world output (FAO). Hence, the low-adoption scenario would be similar to having producers in India or Malaysia adopt futures. The alternative scenario of a relatively widespread adoption of futures is run by employing n A = 0.75 and n N = 0.25. This case of a 75% market share corresponding to adopters would be comparable to having futures adopted by natural rubber producers in all top four producing countries (i.e., Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and India).
Results and Discussion
The simulations provide insights on the impact of futures adoption at two different levels, namely, the effect on the world market for the crop, and the influence on the behaviors of adopters and non-adopters. Both levels of analysis are relevant, but they are conceptually different. Hence, they are addressed separately in the next subsections.
Market Effects
Steady-state results regarding market-level effects are summarized in Recall that the scaling adopted for the simulations implies that in the non-stochastic benchmark scenario, total output, total supply, total consumption, price, and consumption expenditures all equal unity, and storage is zero. Hence, the first and third columns in table 2 show that the introduction of randomness into the non-stochastic economy reduces mean output and consumption by 3.3%, while increasing total supply by slightly over 40%. The latter occurs because mean storage increases from zero to almost 50% of mean output. In addition, random exogenous shocks cause the mean (median) world price to go up by approximately 17% (12%), and mean (median) consumption expenditures to rise by about 12% (8.5%). In the case of total supply, storage, prices, and consumption expenditures, there are substantial differences between means and medians, as well as noticeable asymmetries in the location of the 5% and 95% quantiles indicative of pdfs strongly skewed to the right. In other words, supply, storage, prices, and consumption expenditures tend to be at relatively low levels most of the time, but on a few occasions they achieve quite high magnitudes. In contrast, the pdfs of current consumption are slightly skewed to the left, and the pdfs of total output are essentially symmetric.
Turning to the market-level changes induced by the availability of futures, it is apparent from the comparison of the first and second columns of table 2 that such changes are modest but not necessarily negligible, even when the market share of adopters is as small as 10%. When n A = 0.1, futures availability reduces the means of total supply, storage, prices, and consumption expenditures by 0.2%, 0.9%, 0.4%, and 0.3%, respectively, but increases the means of both total output and consumption by 0.1%. Futures availability also reduces the standard deviations of total supply, consumption, storage, prices, and consumption expenditures by 0.6%, 1.6%, 0.6%, 2.2%, and 2.1%, respectively, but increases the standard deviation of output by 1%.
Comparison of the second and fourth columns of table 2 reveals that futures availability exerts the same qualitative effects when the share of adopters is large (n A = 0.75) as when that share is small (n A = 0.1). However, in percentage terms, the magnitudes of the changes in means and standard deviations induced by futures availability in the large-adopter-share scenario are approximately five times the ones corresponding to the small-adopter-share scenario. For n A = 0.75, making futures available causes the means of total supply, storage, prices, and consumption expenditures to decline by 1.1%, 4.6%, 2.4%, and 1.8%, respectively, and the means of both total output and consumption to increase by 0.5%. As a result of futures adoption, the standard deviations of total supply, consumption, storage, prices, and consumption expenditures fall by 3.5%, 8.3%, 3.2%, 11.2%, and 10.4%, respectively, and the standard deviation of output goes up by 9.3%. These findings indicate that the market-level effects induced by a large proportion of producers adopting futures can be substantial. Given the smaller mean output and the lower mean price received by non-adopters, it is not surprising that their mean profits fall (from 0.662 to 0.656 and from 0.665 to 0.634 when adopters have small and large market shares, respectively) as futures become available. Futures availability is also associated with a reduction in the standard deviation of non-adopter profits (from 0.330 to 0.324 when n A = 0.1, and from 0.341 to 0.307 when n A = 0.75), which stems mostly from the declines in the standard deviations both of prices and planned output.
Effects on the Behaviors of Adopters and Non-Adopters

Effects on Welfare
Welfare is ultimately a function of the level, volatility, and higher moments of the endogenous pdfs. From the results reported in table 2, it seems sensible to infer that consumers gain by making futures available to producers, as mean consumption increases, mean consumption with the availability of futures. As the market share of adopters goes up, however, the collective effect becomes increasingly important. In the presence of an inelastic world demand, the rise in adopter output induced by the availability of futures tends to reduce mean profits for adopters as their market share increases. Futures availability also makes adopters more responsive to market conditions, which reduces the standard deviation of prices as the adopters' market share grows.
Overall, however, when the adopter market share is sufficiently large (i.e., n A > 0.71), the negative welfare impact due to the reduction in mean prices outweighs the positive welfare impact from the individual effect and the reduced standard deviation of prices. Futures availability clearly impacts adopters' farm-level variables, regardless of whether adopters account for a small or a large share of total output. The availability of futures also impacts the behavior of non-adopters, even if the market share of adopting farmers is relatively small. In terms of welfare, consumers clearly benefit from the adoption of futures by producers.
The change in consumer welfare is always positive and monotonically increasing with the market share of adopting farmers. Non-adopters always lose when futures are made available to adopters. Such a loss increases monotonically with the proportion of adopters, and is sizeable if most producers adopt futures. Futures availability is associated with noticeable welfare gains for adopters when their market share is small, and with losses when they account for a sufficiently large portion of the market. On the aggregate, futures availability unambiguously makes farmers worse off, the more so the larger the market share of adopters. For society as a whole, however, futures availability yields a net gain because consumer gains outweigh producer losses, and such societal net gains increase as adoption becomes more widespread.
Overall, our findings suggest that there is no basis for advocating the use of futures as a means to improve commodity producers' well-being. The reasons for this assertion are that producers as a whole lose from making futures available and, more importantly, that futures availability reduces welfare even for adopters, provided the market share of the latter is sufficiently large.
From a policy perspective, the present study raises interesting issues. One of them is that measuring the success of a policy aimed at making futures available to improve producer welfare by the extent of adoption is likely to be misleading. This is true because our results suggest that adopter welfare decreases monotonically with the share of adopters. 
Notes
1. δ 0 = δ 0 and Mean(ε C,t ) = 1 is equivalent to setting δ 0 = δ 0 /y and Mean(ε C,t ) = y for any y > 0.
2. Since x j,t−1 ≡ E t−1 (q j,t ) = E t−1 (x j,t−1 ε qj,t ) = x j,t−1 E t−1 (ε qj,t ), it must be the case that E t−1 (ε qj,t ) = 1.
Mean(ε qj,t ) = 1 then follows immediately by application of the law of iterated expectations.
3. The analysis by Černý (2004) implies that the results from the present model should be robust to changes in the specification of the utility function, as long as the levels of relative risk aversion (defined as −π U"( π)/U'(π)) are kept similar and the risks involved are neither too large nor too asymmetric.
4. As for utility, results should not be sensitive to modifications in the production function, provided the levels of x v'(x)/v"(x) are about the same and the risks are neither very large nor very skewed.
5. It should be clear that A U is obtained by using the no-futures pdf, as experiment 2 prevents producers from using futures. In contrast, computation of ) ( A A Y U involves the no-futures pdf for dates before t, and the pdf corresponding to the futures-availability scenario for dates t and after. StD(ε qj,t ) = 0.07, j = A, N Smallest coefficient of variation (CV) in Table 3 of Priyadarshan et al. (2005) .
Price-Transmission Shocks: Mean(ε pj,t ) = 1, j = A, N Imposed by scaling convention. 
